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Entry and Growth Strategies for Emerging Economies 
 
Abstract 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are expanding their global reach, carrying their 
products and brands to ever more remote corners of the world. They encounter 
business environments that vary not only from their country of origin, but also vary 
greatly amongst each other. Thus foreign investors have to adapt their strategies, most 
notably their marketing and acquisition strategies, to the local context.  
In this paper, we outline why globalisation drives MNEs into emerging 
economies, and we provide conceptual frameworks that may aid investors to adapt 
their strategies to emerging economy contexts. MNEs have to develop a portfolio of 
local and/or global brands that matches their competences with local needs. If they 
aim for market leadership they may pursue a multi-tier strategy, but this needs to be 
supported by an appropriate foundation of global and local resources.  
This strategy in particular requires the acquisition of complementary local 
resources controlled by local firms. However, acquisitions in emerging economies are 
inhibited by institutional obstacles and weak local firms. Thus, foreign investors may 
pursue staged, multiple, indirect, or Brownfield acquisitions to build their projected 
operation. We illustrate our proposed strategies by analysing how one multination 
enterprise  Carlsberg Breweries  has developed its operations in three very different 
emerging economies: Poland, Lithuania and Vietnam.  
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1. Introduction  
Globalisation brings multinational enterprises (MNEs), their products and their brands 
to ever more remote corners of the world. Large populations raise expectations of 
unprecedented demand for consumer goods, if only the right products could be 
delivered in the right places.1 Yet when entering emerging economies, MNEs 
encounter business environments that vary not only from their country of origin, but 
also amongst each other.  
The main attraction of emerging economies is their high economic growth and 
thus the expectation of rapidly increasing demand for consumer goods. Moreover, as 
C.K. Prahalad argues so passionately, there is money to be made at the bottom of the 
pyramid.2, 3 The sheer number of people on low incomes makes even the less 
developed parts of the world attractive to business, if appropriate business concepts 
are developed to serve them.   
However, emerging economies pose unique challenges due to their less 
sophisticated institutional environment, and the weak resource endowment of local 
firms. We outline in this paper how MNEs may cope with these challenges and 
unlock the profit potential in emerging economies. Foreign investors have to design a 
locally adapted entry strategy that establishes a basis from which they can develop 
their local position. To reach their objectives, MNEs must focus on the long-term 
potential of their entry strategy, and continuously readjust their strategy to changing 
circumstances, which may include increased resource commitment at later stages. 
To reach consumers in emerging markets, foreign investors have to adapt their 
marketing, especially their branding strategies. Crucial trade-offs exist between 
developing a global brand for the premium segment, where substantive margins can 
be earned, and developing products with large-scale and cost-efficient production for 
the mass markets, earning profits through volume. We argue that there is potential in 
both, and extra gains await those who can combine global brands and products for the 
bottom of the pyramid.  
To develop an aspired product positioning and market share, foreign investors 
have to carefully design their entry mode, which needs to provide access to crucial 
                                                 
1 D. J. Arnold and J. A. Quelch, New Strategies in Emerging Markets, Sloan Management Review, 
Fall,  7-20 (1998). 
2 C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyradmid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits, 
Prentice Hall, (2004).  
3 C.K. Prahalad and L. H. Stuart, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Strategy + Business, Booz 
Allen Hamilton, (26), 1-14, (2002). 
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local resources such as local brands and distribution channels, and overcome 
inefficiencies in the markets for these resources. Conventionally, entry modes are 
distinguished as Greenfield, acquisition and joint venture, based on the legal form of 
establishment and the equity stake. We introduce a more differentiated terminology 
that provides better support for managerial decision-making. Creative designs of entry 
modes, rather then choosing between textbook models, allow MNEs to accommodate 
their own needs and the peculiarities of the host environment.  
We illustrate our ideas by comparing the strategies of one multinational 
enterprise, Carlsberg Breweries, over the past decade in three different emerging 
economies: Poland, Lithuania and Vietnam. This longitudinal and comparative 
perspective within one MNE allows us to focus on the adaptation of business 
strategies to the local context.  
The traditionally highly fragmented brewing industry has gone through a rapid 
concentration process over the past decade. Yet, even in concentrated markets, local 
and international brands continue to co-exist. The parallel development of multiple 
brands and the structural changes in the industry reflect the trends of many other food 
and beverage industries, which makes brewing a particularly interesting industry to 
analyse. 
 Carlsberg has expanded its operations in emerging economies in the early 
1990s, customizing its entry strategies to local contexts. Vietnam was entered as early 
as 1993 with two joint ventures that serve what is still a low-income economy, yet 
after several years earn substantive profits.4 In the far more developed and relatively 
large Polish market, Carlsberg entered with a partial acquisition in 1996, and has built 
a strong position using a staged acquisition, multiple local acquisitions, and an 
indirect acquisition.5 In the small and less advanced Lithuanian market, Carlsberg 
took over a local brewery in 1999, and acquired further local brands in a global 
merger in 2001.  
We develop our arguments as follows. In Section 2, we outline the pull and 
push factors inducing accelerated FDI into emerging economies: the attraction and 
obstacles of local markets, and the adaptation of MNEs global strategies to changes 
in the global economy. In Section 3, we outline how consumer goods MNEs may 
                                                 
4 T.H. Nguyen, H.V. Nguyen and C.N. Tran: Vietnamese Case Studies, in S. Estrin and K. E. Meyer 
(Eds.), Investment Strategies in Emerging Economies, Cheltenham: Elgar (2004).  
5 M. Bak, Carlsberg Breweries A/S . Case Study of Investment in Poland, mimeo, Institute for Private 
Enterprise and Democracy, Warsaw, and Copenhagen Business School (2004).  
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position their brand portfolio in emerging economies. On this basis, we discuss in 
Section 4 how MNEs may use acquisitions and joint ventures to access crucial 
resources. We conclude with an outlook on how investment opportunities evolve with 
economic growth. 
 
2. Global strategy and local markets 
The accelerated entry into emerging economies over the past decade has been driven 
by both pull and push factors. On the one hand, emerging economies pull in FDI as 
business opportunities galore due to the sheer size of the market and impressive 
economic growth in countries, such as China. On the other hand, MNEs were pushed 
to seek new markets by competitive pressures in their home environments.  
 
Insert Exhibit 1 here 
 
2.1. Opportunities and Challenges of emerging markets  
Emerging economies offer attractive markets for consumer goods and high 
growth potential. Looking beyond the special cases of China and India, Poland - with 
a population of 38 million - is a medium size European market, and Vietnam with 80 
million people is larger then any European country other than Russia (Exhibit 1).  
Poland went through a deep recession in the early 1990s followed by spectacular 
growth over the rest of the decade, while Vietnam more than quadrupled its per capita 
income over the decade 
Despite these attractions, emerging economies do not offer the same level of 
economic development and intricacy of the institutional environment.6, 7 We thus 
define emerging economies as those economies that have high growth or growth 
potential, but do not have the same sophistication of the institutional framework 
as Western Europe or North America. Large and fast growing markets as well as 
low factor costs may in many ways be attractive to businesses; yet foreign entrants 
also faces unique obstacles and risks:  
 
                                                 
6 S. Estrin and K. E. Meyer (Eds.), Investment Strategies in Emerging Economies, Cheltenham: Elgar 
(2004).  
7 N. Dawar and A. Chattopadhay, Rethinking Marketing Programs for Emerging Markets, Long Range 
Planning 35, 457-474 (2002). 
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• Emerging economies are highly volatile due to frequent changes in 
institutions, industrial structure and the macro-economy. Economic growth 
may be high, but crises are frequent, as the Asian crisis of 1997 has reminded 
everyone. This gives advantages to those who develop strategic flexibility to 
react to changing circumstances and grab new business opportunities.8 
• Emerging economies have institutional frameworks that may require different 
ways of interacting with business partners and authorities. Institutional voids 
often inhibit the efficiency of markets, such that firms internalise markets for 
intermediate goods and services such as capital and human capital.9 Moreover, 
businesses rely to a larger extend on relationships as foundation for business 
transactions.10  
• Many resources and capabilities needed to compete in emerging economies 
are context-specific. Local firms and individuals develop their capabilities to 
suit the specific context, which may create major barrier to entry. Foreign 
investors may overcome these barriers by partnering with a local firm.  
• Many industries in emerging economies are highly fragmented as many small 
firms compete for a share of the market. Yet with entry of foreign investors, 
the market structure may rapidly change, adding to the uncertainty in the 
market place.  
 
For this study, we have selected a cross section of emerging economies that have gone 
through a transition to a market economy in recent years. Poland represents a large 
and arguably the most advanced of the European transition economies. Lithuania is a 
small economy that successfully left the sphere of the former Soviet Union, while 
Vietnam is income-wise much closer to the bottom of the pyramid but has shown 
remarkable economic growth for the past 15 years. Exhibit 1 summarizes the complex 
market environments in these three economies. In this paper, we develop some 
suggestions on how companies can operate in such circumstances.  
 
                                                 
8 K. Uhlenbruck, K. E. Meyer, and M. Hitt, Organizational transformation in transition economies: 
Resource-based and organizational learning perspectives, Journal of Management Studies (40), 257-
282, (2003). 
9 T. Khanna and K. Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging Markets, 
Harvard Business Review, July-August, 125-134 (1999). 
10 M. W. Peng: Business Strategies in Transition Economies, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (2000). 
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2.2. Global Strategies  
An explanation of MNE activity in emerging economies must start from an 
understanding of their global strategies. Globalisation has opened many markets and 
increased competition not only in emerging markets, but also in developed countries. 
This compels many MNEs to grow by expanding internationally.  
In liberalised markets, specialist manufacturers and foreign entrants challenge 
diversified conglomerates in the different industries in which they operate. Firms thus 
are under pressure to divest peripheral activities in which they cannot attain industry 
leadership, and focus on an industry where they are best. In this core business, they 
aim for worldwide leadership, and optimise their operations and supply chain on the 
global stage. Many firms thus convert their corporate strategy from related 
diversification in their home market, to a strategy of ‘globalfocusing’ selling a 
core product worldwide, in both mature and emerging economies.11
This process can be conceptualised by considering the context and industry 
specificity of the companies resources, or their core competences. We can think of a 
firms bundle of resources in terms of their transferability and applicability in other 
countries and in other industries. Some capabilities, such as knowledge of local 
consumer behaviour and the political institutional system of a country, are highly 
specific to a given country, but can be profitably deployed in other industries within 
this country. Other resources, such as products and technologies, are specific to the 
industry and can readily be applied in another country.  
Globalisation is changing the relative importance of industry and country 
specific resources. Liberalization is opening markets, thus reducing the advantages of 
incumbents context specific capabilities and triggering foreign entry. The ensuing 
intensified competition raises the importance of industry specific competences to stay 
ahead in the competition. In other words, traditional barriers to entry to countries are 
declining while barriers to entry to industries are become relatively more important. 
As technological and administrative barriers to trade dwindle, strategies focused on a 
single country become less feasible.  
Gradual liberalisation in Europe has induced firms to convert themselves from 
diversified conglomerates to global specialists in their respective industry. As industry 
specialists, they aim for global leadership in their chosen segment. This trend o of 
                                                 
11 K. E. Meyer, Globalfocusing: From Domestic Conglomerate to Global Specialist, DRC Working 
Paper no 16, Center for New and Emerging Markets, London Business School, March (2003). 
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globalfocusing can be observed in many manufacturing industries, especially those 
serving business-to-business markets.12 FDI in emerging economies can serve this 
objective by providing a global supply base, or by extending the market reach.  
 The brewing industry has seen globalfocusing strategies of the largest firms in 
the industry. Beer is a traditional and culturally embedded product, especially in 
Europe. Until the middle the 20th century, the short shelf life, difficulty of transporting 
beer plus tariffs and national quality standards reduced the reach of international 
brands.13 Moreover, consumers have developed loyalty to their local brands, most 
notably in Germany but also in emerging economies such as the Czech Republic. 
However, in recent years consumption has been stagnant or even declining in Europe, 
while per capita consumption has been growing fast in Asia. 
On the global stage, the industry has gone through rapid concentration and 
internationalisation processes over the past two decades. Leading players expanded 
internationally often by acquisition, most notably in global mergers such as Ambev-
Interbrew and SAB-Miller. At the same time, many emerging markets witnessed 
acquisition-driven concentration processes at the national level.  
Carlsberg has participated in the trend of globalfocusing in a gradual manner. 
It has for decades focused on the brewing industry but also invested in loosely related 
activities. In the 1990s, Carlsberg expanded the beer business internationally, and 
strengthening its core business and its global reach. In 1990, 34% of its turnover was 
non-beer business mainly in Denmark, which fell to 16% by the end of the decade. 
Over the same time period, brewing activities outside Denmark grew from 38% to 
74% of turnover.14 In 2003, less then 5% of beer brewed by Carlsberg was sold in 
Denmark.15 Thus, by the turn of the millennium, Carlsberg became one of the top 5 
brewers worldwide, focused on brewing with few side activities, and generating 
turnover chiefly outside its home base of Denmark.  
A milestone in the strategic repositioning of Carlsberg has been the merger 
with Norwegian brewer Orkla in 2000. At that time, Orkla had expanded in the 
Nordic region and, via 50%-owned Baltic Beverage Holding (BBH), in Russia and the 
Baltic States by acquiring and developing local breweries and local brands, such as 
                                                 
12 Meyer (2003): see reference 11.  
13 R. Benson-Armer, J. Leibowitz and D. Ramachandran, Global beer, whats on tap?, The McKinsey 
Quarterly, Number 1 (1999) 
14 Carlsberg: annual reports (various years). From financial year 2000/01 onwards, Carlsberg no longer 
reports these data in its annual report in the same format. 
15 Carlsberg: annual report 2003 (2004).  
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Baltika in Russia. Carlsberg had pushed primarily its global premium brands, 
Carlsberg and Tuborg, into a range of markets worldwide, using mainly minority 
stakes in joint ventures and licensing. The merged company could draw on a wider 
range of human and financial resources, and combine the development of the 
global brand along with the management of a portfolio of local brands. Thus, 
local brands have moved from a side activity to a central part of the business strategy 
around 2000.  
The renewed focus on exploiting core brewing competences worldwide 
accelerated Carlsbergs involvement in emerging economies. In the 1990s, Carlsberg 
expanded in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia, often through joint ventures. 
After the merger, Carlsberg accelerated its investments in emerging economies. Thus, 
in 2003, 75% of sales were in Western Europe, 21% in Eastern Europe and 4% in 
Asia. The expansion in emerging economies continues, for instance in China where 
by summer 2004 Carlsberg has acquired equity in breweries in eight different 
provinces.   
 Pressures of globalisation thus push foreign investors into emerging 
economies, yet how do they take advantage of the new opportunities? We next outline 
the trade-offs and synergies between premium and bottom-end strategies in emerging 
economies, before analysing ways to acquire complementary local resources.  
 
3. Brand portfolio for emerging consumers 
Emerging economies pose different challenges for marketing then industrialised 
countries. Typically, incomes are low, labour is relatively cheap, and the customer 
groups are highly variable. However, Dawar and Chattopadhay show that even under 
these conditions foreign investors can profitably serve these markets by adapting 
strategies to these local contexts.16 For instance, low-income groups can be served by 
cost-efficient production of mass products, emphasising economies of scale and 
earning profits through the volume of sales. Low incomes constrain demand, but the 
corresponding low wages also create opportunities for people-intensive approaches to 
marketing. For instance, sales assistants may hand out samples or promotion 
materials, or support the service in bars and restaurants. Lower staff costs also allow 
for delivery of smaller but more frequent shipments to sales outlets. 
                                                 
16 N. Dawar and A. Chattopadhay (2002), see reference 7. 
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The variability of customer groups in terms of income and regions, challenge 
MNEs aiming for large market shares because markets may be highly segmented. 
Principally, foreign entrants could choose between three types of strategy:  
 
1. Global branding strategy  global brand with little or no adaptation, positioned 
as premium brand.  
2. Local branding strategy  portfolio of local brands, positioned to serve mass 
markets.  
3. Multi-tier branding strategy  portfolio of global local and brands, positioned 
to serve different segments of the market.  
 
Insert Exhibit 2 here 
 
3.1. Global Brands 
These strategic alternatives exist also in industrialized economies; yet the 
segmentation of markets makes the choice of strategy particularly crucial in emerging 
economies. In emerging economies, one can expect large margin differences 
between global brands and local mainstream brands. On the one hand, the mass 
market is highly price sensitive and local competitors may offer standard products at 
low prices. On the other hand, the premium segment is the prerogative of the middle 
and upper classes that are less price sensitive (Exhibit 2). As economic growth picks 
up, demand in the premium segment is likely to increase while new entrants intensify 
competition and thus reduce the margins that can be earned  as indicated by dashed 
lines in Exhibit 2.  
The suitability of the three alternative strategies, and thus the relative weight 
given to global and local brands in the product portfolio, varies with the structure of 
the industry and the firms own resources and capabilities. A global brand strategy 
allows foreign entrants to serve the premium segment where substantive margins can 
be earned. This segment is often small but can be attractive because the middle class 
in emerging economies often has substantial purchasing power  even if average 
incomes are low. Thus volumes are typically small, while margins in terms of profits 
per unit sold may be large.  
A cultural feature of Asian economies makes the premium segment 
particularly attractive. When going out with business associates or friends, or when 
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bringing gifts, one is expected to demonstrate status and prosperity as well as 
appreciation for the guests by offering the best product or brand. This phenomenon, 
known as conspicuous consumption in economics, implies that demand for the most 
expensive brand may exceed that of a less pricey premium brand. Brands thus benefit 
from being positioned as the best.  
Serving the premium segment requires first and foremost a recognized global 
brand, but also the ability to communicate the premium brand values locally, and to 
guarantee quality standards under occasionally adverse conditions.  It does, however, 
not necessarily require direct investment. As premium brands often use country of 
origin as part of their image, they may be exported and distributed through local 
agents. Even high import taxes do not prevent an export strategy because the premium 
segment is less price-sensitive. Dependent on the nature of the product, a contractual 
agreement with a local licensee or sales agent may provide an appropriate avenue to 
supply a quality product to local consumers.17   
 
3.2. Going Local 
A portfolio of local brands produced cost-efficiently and serving the mass 
market may not generate huge sales margins, but it allows building market share and 
profiting from economies scale and the volume of sales. One cent earned for each of 
a thousand units is as good as 1 dollar earned per item but selling only 10 units.  
Consumer goods, notably durable goods such as washing machines or 
motorcycles, may be adapted to the needs and purchasing power of emerging 
economies by reducing the variety of models and by stripping out non-essential 
product features. At the same time, product features may be adjusted to the needs of 
emerging markets, such as robustness in the presence of unreliable electricity supply 
and lack of a local service network. This product adjustment may require 
development costs, yet it increases economies of scale and thus reduces production 
costs. Such an adapted product may reach new consumers in emerging economies, 
while generating profits for the foreign investors.18, 19
                                                 
17 Selling a premium brand through an agent however entails certain risks due to the lack of control 
over the distributional channel. Moreover, protection of intellectual property rights is often easier for 
firms with a registered local subsidiary, for instance in China, where only locally registered firms can 
take legal action to protect their trademarks.  
18 R. Batra, Marketing Issues and Challenges in Transition Economies, Journal of International 
Marketing 5 (4), 95-114 (1997).  
19 Dawar and Chattopadhay (2002), see reference 3. 
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A portfolio of local brands may be particularly suitable for emerging 
economies where incomes are low on average, but vary considerably within the 
country. Moreover, low-income economies such as Vietnam may have regional 
segmentation of markets as a result of high transportation costs (relative to value 
added), local attachment of people, limited reach of media, and people-intensive 
distribution networks. Mainstream brands from Europe or North America may be too 
costly for most local consumers, and thus do not allow building large market share. 
Without a substantive market, however, the entrant lacks power in the market and 
maintaining the distribution network may become prohibitively expensive. Thus, an 
adapted low cost product provides opportunities to build market share, and to benefit 
from market growth. Moreover, as markets may be rapidly concentrating following 
the entry of foreign investors, a stake in the mass market may be a good basis to build 
an industry leadership position.  
However, in this segment, competition may be fierce and margins may be low. 
Local firms that produce at relatively low costs often dominate the mass market. To 
compete in this segment, foreign entrants have to focus on competences in how to 
manage production and marketing in emerging economy conditions, and exploit their 
operational knowledge to gain competitive advantage over local competitors.  
 
3.3. Multi-tier Strategies 
By combining global and local brands, foreign entrants can benefit from both 
strategies, while realizing synergies between their brands. Building local brands to 
penetrate emerging markets and simultaneously introducing companys international 
brands has become a common strategy for consumer goods MNEs. Such a multi-
tier strategy is a compromise between globalisation and localisation may thus solve 
the dilemma of either not attaining substantial market share, or not capitalizing on the 
global brand value.20, 21 Acquired local brands or newly developed regional brands 
cater to the medium- or low-price segments of the market, while the global brands 
aim at the upper end. 
Serving both premium and mainstream segments creates important 
synergy effects, especially in sharing distribution channels. The global brand may 
                                                 
20 A. Schuh, Global standardization as a success formula for marketing in Central Eastern Europe? 
Jounal of World Business,133-148 (2000). 
21 Batra (1997), see reference 18. 
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be pushed through the existing channels of the local brands, as it may be prohibitively 
expensive to build a channel for the global brand alone. Moreover, the brand value of 
a local brand may be enhanced through association with the global brand.  
With economic development, demand for premium brands is likely to pick up 
 especially for those brands already known to aspiring new consumers and reachable 
through local distribution. Early movers may then earn high returns on their early 
investment in a premium brand.  
Thus, a flexible combination of international, national and regional brands can 
serve consumer segments and consumption patterns that vary within countries. A 
multi-tier strategy, however, requires the MNE to possess crucial resources for both 
segments. Thus they need a global brand and the capabilities of marketing and 
delivering this brand at high quality, as well as operational capabilities that enable 
successful competition with local competitors familiar with the local context and 
producing at low costs.   
Insert Exhibit 3 here 
 
Exhibit 3 summarises the key arguments supporting the crucial decisions on 
emphasising respectively global and local brands in the brand portfolio in emerging 
economies. Firms with a high brand value in their leading brand, and the capabilities 
to support this brand in remote corners of the world, would choose a global brand 
strategy. Firms with operational knowledge in the industry, but without a global 
brand, can expand in emerging markets by building local brands. Industry leaders 
that can combine a global brand with operational knowledge applicable in 
emerging economies can pursue a multi-tier strategy. If, on the other hand, a firm 
has neither a global brand nor operational capabilities that are transferable to 
emerging economies, it may as well stay home. A foreign entry would require them to 
develop a brand and capabilities as they go, which is a highly risky strategy.  
 
3.4. Carlsberg’s Branding Strategy  
In the brewing industry, as in many other food industries, all three strategies 
can be observed. Food products are typically influenced by local culture and 
traditions; and occasions of purchase and consumption, taste, and the regional origin 
of the product play a great role in the buying process. In addition, customers tend to 
be loyal to local products, which creates barriers to entry for international brands. 
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However, the global leaders in the brewing industry are moving towards multi-tier 
strategies, albeit with different emphasis of their global and local brands.  
 Global brand strategies are being pursued by top premium brands, such as 
Corona or Guinness. They serve a particular niche market through exports, and use 
their country of origin as part of their brand image. Arguably, Carlsberg pursued a 
global brand strategy until the 1990s as it focused on its two global brands, Carlsberg 
and Tuborg, while treating local brands as a side activity. In many emerging 
economies, the Carlsberg brand was brewed in joint ventures or under licensing to an 
independent firm, while elsewhere it was exported. 
 The local brand strategy has been pursued most famously by South African 
Breweries (SAB), who expanded in the 1990s from their base in South Africa to 
emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Typically, they acquire 
local breweries and reorganize the production and marketing operations to make them 
profitable. SAB develops local brands that fit the local market needs, while at the 
same time increasing productivity by replicating its low cost-brewing techniques and 
rigorously applying standardized management procedures in every functional area.22 
Similarly, BBH (which was owned 50% by Orkla) has built a strong position in many 
countries of the former Soviet Union (33% market share in Russia) by acquiring and 
revamping local brands. Beer is, despite possible standardization of production, a 
highly culturally embedded product and many consumers relate with their local brand, 
and its specific taste. This provides competitive advantages to MNEs such as SAB 
that know how to develop a portfolio of brands in new markets. 
 Following C.K. Prahalads ideas23, the localization strategy might even be 
taken further. At the bottom of the pyramid, beer is mostly consumed on-site, in small 
bars and restaurants. In Vietnam, on-site trade accounts for 84% of beer sales, of 
which 28% are Bia Hoi  traditional restaurants brewing their own beer.24 Why not 
develop brewing technology for the Bia Hoi segment, develop a business concept 
that combines it with some ideas from micro-brewery restaurants in Europe, and then 
use franchising to expand all over Vietnam  and then to China,  and then back 
to Europe?  
                                                 
22 The merger of SAB with US-based Miller provides SAB not only with access to the large US 
market, but also with a brand that could be developed into a global brand. Thus the merger may have a 
similar underlying logic as the Carlsberg-Orkla merger.  
23 C.K. Prahalad (2004), see reference 3.  
24 47% maintstream, on trade; 9% premium, on-trade, 16% off-trade (internal Carlsberg document).  
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Global market leaders, such as Heineken and Interbrew, mostly pursue a 
multi-tier strategy. Carlsberg joined this trend in recent years. The merger with Orkla 
in 2000 provided the new company with the resources to support a fully developed 
multi-tier strategy combining a global brand with local brands.  
 
Insert exhibit 4 here 
 
 In the three markets of our study, the Carlsberg brand is positioned as a 
locally-brewed international premium brand (Exhibit 4), which is complemented by a 
national premium brand, Okocim in Poland, Svyturys in Lithuania and Halida in 
Vietnam. Regional and niche market brands complete the product portfolios. The 
price differences between market segments are large, as local brands are substantially 
cheaper then in industrialised countries, while prices for premium brands vary less 
between countries. Thus, top brands sell at substantial premium. The Carlsberg brand 
may be priced about 25% above mainstream brands in Poland, compared to about 
10% in Germany. 
The creation of a brand portfolio can be illustrated for Poland. During the 
consolidation process of the Carlsberg group in Poland, the number of local 
brands was reduced, while some acquired brands were replaced with the new 
ones. Carlsberg distinguishes two types of brands: main brands, like Carlsberg, 
Okocim Jasne Pełne, Okocim Mocne, and Karmi, and supporting brands, which 
include acquired regional brands, but also newly created brands for niche markets.25
 Until 2002, marketing in Poland concentrated on two brands  Carlsberg and 
Okocim. At a regional level, the group focused on strengthening the position of 
Kasztelan, Bosman and Piast in their respective home markets. After the 
consolidation of the portfolio of national and local brands, Carlsberg undertook a 
major branding initiative in May 2002 to reposition the Carlsberg brand as premium 
brand. In most acquired firms, only two leading beers were selected for continuation 
and development. Carlsberg upgraded their methods of production, focusing on 
improving the product and package quality. The sales strategy now emphasizes 
independent distributors selling the full range of the group's products.   
                                                 
25 Bak (2003), see reference 5.  
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An example of Carlsbergs ambition to build a global premium brand is its 
extensive sponsorship of international sport events. For example, its association with 
Euro 2004 allowed Carlsberg to reach even pubs in Vietnam where European football 
is very popular, and fans stay up all night to follow their favourite teams live.  
To sum up, the design of the brand and product portfolio is crucial for 
marketing success in emerging economies. The fragmentation of the markets suggests 
quite distinct markets for global and local brands, with major differences in volumes 
and margins. Many MNEs pursue a multi-tier branding strategy, yet we see merits in 
each strategy. 
The optimal combination of local and global brands depends on the value of 
the firms resources and capabilities in a given institutional context, industry 
structure, and consumer behaviour. MNEs with global brand recognition and the 
organizational capabilities to support this brand in far-flung places may perform best 
with a global brand strategy. Firms with operational knowledge on how to build 
brands in emerging economies, and how to run production efficiently in an emerging 
economy context may best focus on developing a portfolio of local brands. A multi-
tier strategy is most ambitious and most likely to lead to long-term market leadership; 
yet it requires both a global brand and local operational capabilities.  
  
4. Acquisition of local firms and resources 
Whichever strategy foreign entrants pursue to penetrate emerging economies, they 
need access to local assets and networks. Yet, local firms commonly control these 
resources, in particular brands and distribution channels. In some political and 
institutional contexts, also political goodwill and legitimacy may be better built by 
cooperating with a local firm. Thus an acquisition of a local firm appears an obvious 
mode of entry.  
Yet acquisitions in emerging economies are fraught with obstacles and have to 
be prepared and implemented carefully. Potential acquisition targets are rare as 
resource endowments of local firms are often weak. Where suitable acquisition targets 
are found, their technological upgrading and organizational integration may require 
considerable additional investment. Moreover, the relevant capital market institutions 
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are not well developed, which increases transaction costs of evaluating, negotiating 
and contracting an acquisition.26
Although few local firms possess internationally competitive resources, they 
may even so be attractive partners. Firstly, they may control context-specific 
resources such as brands, distribution networks and knowledge of the local political 
and institutional framework. Traditional distribution channels in emerging economies 
are often based on personal relationships, which creates barriers to entry for 
newcomers. Especially late entrants in oligopolistic markets may be compelled to 
enter by acquisition to access to a substantive market share. Secondly, regulatory 
constraints may limit foreign equity ownerships and thus require working with a local 
partner. Thirdly, local firms hold valuable human capital at least in terms of 
absorptive capacity. The staff of the relatively advanced local firms may be best 
qualified to participate in further training and to adopt new technologies that may be 
transferred by the foreign investor. 
Insert Exhibit 5 here 
 
4.1. New Forms of Acquisition Strategies 
Decision-makers have to think creatively how to design their entry mode such 
as to overcome the obstacles to acquisition entry. The crucial strategic decision is 
how to design the operation – rather then choosing from a set of given modes, 
called acquisition, Greenfield or joint venture, as much of the academic literature 
implicitly assumes. Many obstacles may best be overcome by customising a mode to 
the local context, rather than opting for a second best mode. The contributions of local 
or regional partners can be arranged in many different ways, from contractual 
cooperation to full acquisition.  
Thus, unsurprisingly, acquisitions in emerging economies follow different 
patterns then in industrialized economies. As a consequence of weak resource 
endowments and institutional idiosyncrasies, acquisitions often take unusual forms, 
notably staged, multiple, indirect and Brownfield acquisition, as well as JVs (Exhibit 
5). 
A staged acquisition runs counter to the conventional wisdom that it is 
better to get full ownership and control of the operations, especially ahead of difficult 
                                                 
26 Estrin and Meyer (2004), see reference 2.  
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restructuring challenges. Staged acquisitions are initially partial acquisitions in which 
the foreign investor aims to take full control later. The increase of the foreign 
investors equity stake may be pre-planned at the outset, or occur in response to 
changes in the environment, notably the FDI regulation. Like joint ventures, partial 
acquisitions are potentially subject to many conflicts that require compromises among 
shareholders, and the ownership structure is rarely stable.  
Why are investors in emerging economies willing to make such compromises? 
Often, the previous owner is unwilling to sell outright. This is common for both 
privatisation agencies and family-owned businesses  the most frequent sellers of 
enterprises in emerging markets.  
However, there can also be advantages for the acquirer from continuous 
involvement of the previous owner. Firstly, a low level involvement provides a 
foreign investor with a platform from which to expand if the business develops 
favourably, while at the same time retaining the flexibility not to commit further 
resources if prospects turn out to be less promising. 
 Secondly, if the state or an influential local conglomerate share the risks as 
well as the profits of the business, they may also help alleviate potential adverse 
interference by bureaucrats in less predictable institutional environments. Networks 
with authorities are important in many emerging economies, and creating mechanisms 
by which the local authorities benefit from business prosperity may be a way to build 
such network and legitimacy.27  
A major concern in staged acquisitions may be whether to transfer knowledge 
and engage in deep restructuring before acquiring full control. Some investors wait 
until they attained full equity control before investing in restructuring and upgrading. 
Transaction cost theory would lead us to expect that investors are unwilling to share 
resources as long as they have only a minority equity stake because the possibility of 
local partners using received assets for unauthorised, competitive purposes is higher. 
However, even without majority ownership, extensive knowledge transfer can take 
place, especially if the relevant technology is not considered leading edge in terms 
of the foreign partners global competition. Studying FDI in a variety of emerging 
economies, Estrin and Meyer observe that in some staged acquisitions, the deep 
                                                 
27 K.E. Meyer, Management Challenges in Privatization Acquisitions in Transition Economies, Journal 
of World Business 37 (4), 266-276 (2002). 
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restructuring was initiated soon after the initial entry while elsewhere it was delayed 
until the foreign investor attained majority control.28
Multiple acquisitions are another strategy commonly observed in emerging 
economies. In fragmented markets, a single acquisition may not suffice to attain a 
strong market position. Yet, foreign investors would normally aim to become a leader 
in whichever industry they decide to enter. Thus multiple acquisitions can build a 
strong nationwide market position in a market that traditionally has been highly 
fragmented. In consequence, an acquisition is often only a small building bloc in 
building the envisaged new operation in an emerging economy. 
Multiple acquisitions however pose additional challenges for the integration of 
the acquired businesses. This may include concentration of head-office functions in 
one location  foreign investors often prefer the capital of the country  and the 
construction of new production facilities realising economies of scale and applying 
latest technology. This however may not be popular in the provincial towns where the 
acquired firms have their historical roots. The organizational integration may also 
transcend national borders, for instance when logistics are integrated in pan-European 
operations with production capacity sharing. Leadership as well as political 
sensitivity in managing external relationships are essential for success in these 
restructuring and integration processes.  
 Indirect acquisitions occur as a by-product of an acquisition in a different 
country. In rare cases, the operation in an emerging economy is actually the strategic 
asset that inspired the third-country acquisition. However, if they are not directly 
competing, it is possible to run them as separate business units. Such an indirect 
acquisition may be a short cut to gain the market shares fast, while avoiding complex 
negotiations with authorities and especially labour unions in emerging economies. If 
on the other hand, the global merger as acquisition had entirely unrelated objectives, 
then the local affiliates of both MNEs may have to be integrated, whether or not the 
local business units actually fit.  
 A Brownfield acquisition is an acquisition where the post-acquisition 
investment exceeds the original acquisition.29 The restructuring needs of some firms 
in emerging markets are so extensive that foreign investors have essentially replaced 
                                                 
28 Estrin and Meyer (2004), see reference 6. 
29 K.E. Meyer and S. Estrin, Brownfield Entry in Emerging Markets, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 31 (3), 575-584 (2001). 
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all resources apart from a few sought after assets, such as brand names, licenses or 
distribution channels, and created a new operation that almost resembles a greenfield 
plant. This phenomenon has been observed in particular in acquisitions related to the 
privatisation process in Eastern Europe, but also in other emerging markets.30 Foreign 
investors are willing to shoulder the burden of transforming uncompetitive enterprises 
if the perceived value of the key assets exceeds the restructuring costs. However, 
Brownfield acquisition may also result from investors underestimating the challenges 
of restructuring enterprises in emerging economies.  
Joint ventures provide an alternative means to access local resources, 
especially if the law does not permit partial or full acquisitions. Moreover, in many 
cases foreign investors may not want to take responsibility for an existing local firm 
because the restructuring challenges would be too daunting, or the firm has activities 
in other unrelated businesses that are of no interest to the foreign investor. In a joint 
venture, a new organization is created, and only selected resources are transferred 
leaving the core businesses of both partners separate. However, like partial or staged 
acquisitions, the ownership arrangement is inherently instable and allows for conflicts 
between the parents.  
 
4.2. Carlsberg’s Acquisition Strategies 
 The experience of Carlsberg illustrates the complexity of entry strategies in 
emerging economies. In building its market positions in Poland, Lithuania and 
Vietnam, Carlsberg used and combined many types of acquisition, reacting to 
opportunities to expand the business as they emerged. Appendix 1 shows the timeline 
of entry and expansion over more than a decade.  
 In Poland, Carlsberg combined multiple entry modes to build its market 
position. It first acquired in 1996 a 31.6% minority stake in one of Polands oldest 
breweries, Okocim, which had been privatised in 1992. This equity stake was 
gradually increased to over 95% in 2004  a staged acquisition. Even with shared 
control, they obtained control over crucial aspect of the business, for instance by 
appointing its people to key positions through its ownership of the premium brand.31  
To build a substantive market share and to challenge the market leaders, 
Carlsberg needed more than Okocim; and they pursued a strategy of multiple 
                                                 
30 Estrin and Meyer (2004): see reference 6. 
31 Bak (2004), see reference 5.  
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acquisitions. In 2001, Carlsberg-Okocim acquired two breweries, Kasztelan and 
Bosman, from German brewery Bitburger. In the same year, Carlsberg took over 
Dyland in the Netherlands, which owned the Polish brewery Piast  an indirect 
acquisition. In this acquisition drive, Carlsberg followed the trend set by its main 
competitors in Poland, Heineken and SAB. The aggressive acquisition strategies by 
the global players have led to a rapid concentration of the Polish brewing industry. In 
less then 10 years, a highly fragmented industry became dominated by 3 major 
players controlling almost 90% of the market. The competitive dynamics have 
changed so much that business challenges almost resemble those in Western Europe. 
 The four breweries have been organizationally integrated from 2002 onwards 
under joint brand management. Production has been recognized to realize economies 
of scale, reduce the number of production sites, and to increase productivity at two 
anchor plants in Szczecin and Brzesko and one support plant in Slerpc.32 From 2004, 
the integration extends beyond Polish borders as Carlsberg affiliates in different 
European countries share production capacity. However, this integration process has 
not been without setbacks as Carlsberg temporarily lost market share.33 As an 
ambitious investor that came relatively late, Carlsberg thus had to use multiple tracks 
to build a strong market position. Continuous investment, development of niche 
brands, and adept integration of separate operations are hoped to enable Carlsberg to 
challenge the market leaders.   
 In Lithuania, Carlsberg acquired almost full ownership of local market leader 
Svyturys in 1999. Around the same time, 50%-Orkla-owned BBH acquired two 
breweries, Utenus Alus and Kalnapilis. After the Carlsberg-Orkla merger, the 
competition authorities intervened because the joint market share exceeded 40%. 
Thus, Kalnapilis was sold, while Svyturys and Utenus Alus were legally and 
operationally integrated with BBHs operations in the Baltic States. Thus Carlsberg 
acquired market leadership by indirect acquisition. In fact, the merger with Orkla was 
to large extent motivated by Orklas strong position in Russia and the Baltic States.  
In Vietnam, the evolution of the brewing industry has been less dramatic. 
Carlsberg established two joint ventures in 1993 with participation of local state-
owned firms and the Danish governmental investment fund IFU. Thus Carlsberg 
acquired an early position in this fast-growing industry. The JVs are structured with 
                                                 
32 Carlsberg Nyt (newsletter for shareholders), August 12, 2004. 
33 Bak (2004), see reference 5.  
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both partners contributing resources and sharing control; and the local firm has 
realised synergies and spillovers.34 Carlsberg maintains control indirectly through its 
brand name, by having at least one expatriate permanently based in Hanoi, and - 
initially - by having a Danish financial investor as a partner. In 2003, Carlsberg 
bought out the financial investor and increased its equity to respectively 50% and 
60%, while the role of the local partners remained unchanged. The JV is expanding 
organically with the growth of the market, while anticipating further foreign entry and 
concentration processes once the market is fully liberalized.  
To sum up, entry in emerging economies may require combining a range of 
different strategies and entry modes. Carlsberg combined staged, indirect and multiple 
acquisitions, as well as joint ventures, to access crucial market assets  especially 
brand names and access to distribution networks  in each of the three countries of 
our study. The local firms were strong players in the local market such that none of 
the acquisitions became a Brownfield acquisition requiring immediate large 
investments. The different modes presented in Exhibit 5 can be adopted and combined 
to suit the local industry structure, consumer behaviour and the institutional 
environment.  
 
5. Outlook 
MNEs are expanding into emerging economies pulled by the attraction of large and 
growing markets, and pushed by increasing competition and limited growth in their 
home market. We outlined how they may design an appropriate strategy that matches 
local opportunities with their own resource-mix. 
  Many MNEs position themselves in emerging economy markets by 
developing and exploiting their global brands. A few others, like SAB, focus on 
competences in running operations efficiently under emerging market conditions and 
with local brands. However, such a strategy requires not only the development of 
local second tier brands, but business concepts that fit the context.35 Both strategies 
have their merits, and investors have to analyse their own core competences to 
develop an appropriate strategy. 
 Synergies can be realized by combining global and local brands, notably the 
sharing of distribution networks, and the promotion of the global brand in anticipation 
                                                 
34 Nguyen et al. (2004), see reference 4. 
35 Prahalad (2004) see reference 2.  
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of rising demand. Thus, multi-tier branding has become the preferred strategy by 
those MNEs that aspire industry leadership. The increasing use of local brands in 
emerging economies by worldwide operating MNEs, especially in traditional or 
culturally embedded products, represents a hidden globalisation, as consumers often 
are unaware of their reach.36 However, this strategy requires simultaneously global 
brands and operational capabilities suitable for emerging economies.   
 Complementary context-specific resources can be obtained by entering by JV 
or by acquiring a local firm. However, appropriate design (rather than choice) of entry 
mode is crucial to capture local resources without losing control over ones own 
resources, or being draw into complex enterprise transformation processes. Given the 
multitude of obstacles to acquisitions in emerging economies, foreign investors use 
non-conventional forms of acquisition  staged, multiple, indirect and Brownfield. 
Yet the initial entry is only a basis from which an entrant can develop its 
operations in emerging markets and can aspire to market leadership. The entry 
strategy should permit strategic flexibility to react to changes in a volatile local 
environment. Emerging economies experience frequent changes in demand and 
supply conditions, and in the institutional environment. Businesses have to be able to 
react, and change their strategy at the right time, for instance by establishing small 
platform investments that provide a basis for later expansion,37 or by limiting capital 
commitment while appointing key finance and marketing personnel in the operation. 
Once foreign investors are in the market, they would be eager to exploit their 
newly-gained local capabilities  just as local firms do. Context-specific resources 
such as business networks and local brands can be spread across different lines of 
business. MNE affiliates may thus serve different segments, delivering not only their 
global premium brand, but developing local brands for the mass market, and utilizing 
scale economies in the distribution channels. They may also provide a broader range 
of products then in their home markets as their local subsidiaries aim to leverage their 
context-specific capabilities by diversifying into related businesses.38 Their possible 
path of expansion should be taken into account when considering the entry strategy. 
                                                 
36 A. Schuh, Globalization as diffusion process: An analysis of the dissemination of Western brands in 
Central and Eastern Europe, EIBA conference, Copenhagen, December (2003). 
37 Kogut, Bruce and N. Kulatilaka, Option Thinking and Platform Investment: Investing Opportunities, 
California Management Review, Winter, 52-71 (1994). 
38 A. Delios, D. Xu and P.W. Beamish: Diversification Strategies, Host Country Institutions, and the 
Exit Rates of Foreign Subsidiaries, mimeo, National University of Singapore (2003).  
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 The rapid concentration process observed for instance in the Polish brewing 
industry signals that the patterns of competition in some emerging economies may 
quickly converge with those in, say, Western Europe. In the words of Carlsbergs 
Executive Vice President Bjørn Wiggen: Poland has developed very fast over the 
last 14 years, and we now regard it to be on the level of the mature Western European 
markets in many aspects. In some areas it is more difficult to develop the business in 
e.g. Germany than in Poland, because of the large bureaucracy.39 In both Poland 
and Lithuania, Carlsberg was both respondent and driver in the rapid concentration 
process in the national brewing industry. In such concentration processes, early 
movers are at an advantage if they also have the resources to continuously invest in 
the market, and to take over local competitors as opportunities emerge.  
 The rapid economic development in emerging markets continuously changes 
the challenges for foreign investors. Growing incomes are likely to increase demand 
and trigger entry by new competitors. Early investors in premium segments may then 
capitalize on brand reputation that has been built while sales of the premium brand 
were still small. Thus foreign investors may serve emergent customers with multi-tier 
branding, and implement their strategy by building and acquiring local resources, and 
combining them with the MNCs global capabilities.  
 Moreover, foreign investors have to maintain flexibility and be willing to 
commit additional resources. To achieve strategic flexibility, they may develop their 
local brands and draw on local partner's capabilities, including relationships with 
other businesses and authorities. Designing entry strategies that reflect the special 
opportunities and challenges in emerging markets will enable them to succeed in  
emerging markets.  
                                                 
39 Interview at Carlsberg headquarters, July 6, 2004. 
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 Exhibit 1: Evolution of the Market Environment since 1990 
 Poland Lithuania Vietnam 
Market Size (1990 ! 2002) 
 Population     (million)  
 GDP p.c.      (US$) 
 p.c. beer consumption       
            (liter, 1999 ! 2002) 
 
38.2 ! 38.5 
4,267 ! 5,007 
 
52 ! 68  
 
3.6 ! 3.5 
n.a. ! 4,028 
 
54 !78  
 
66 ! 80 
78 ! 436 
 
7,6 ! 9,0  
Consumer taste  Long beer tradition, 
lager and dark beers, 
lager more popular. 
Beer replacing 
beverages with higher 
alcohol content such as 
vodka. 
Long beer tradition, 
lager and dark beers, 
lager more popular. 
Beer replacing 
beverages with higher 
alcohol content such as 
vodka. 
Little beer tradition, 
low consumption, 
preference for s light 
beers, with less foam 
and sweeter beer then in 
Europe. Beer as part of 
new lifestyle and 
replacing tea as 
accompaniment to 
meals. 
Consumption patterns  Mainly off-site trade, 
large bottles (0,5l) and 
cans. As refreshment 
drink, beer is mixed 
with fruit or spices.  
Mainly off-site trade, 
80% sales to retail 
chains. 
High share of on-site 
consumption, especially 
in the premium 
segment; Preference for 
cans; high share of Bia 
Hoi, beer brewed in 
restaurants.  
Industry structure Initially highly 
fragmented, rapidly 
concentrating.  
Initially oligopolistic, 
increased concentration. 
Highly fragmented, 
slow concentration 
process.   
Institutions concerning FDI Ownership restrictions 
rapidly phased out; 
privatisation to outside 
investors, often with 
minority stake to 
employees.  
Ownership restrictions 
rapidly phased out; 
privatisation often to 
insiders of the firm.  
Ownership restrictions 
required JV, relaxed 
only in the late 1990s; 
little privatisation.  
Source for Exhibit 1: www.worldbank.org; Production, Imports, Total Consumption and Consumption 
per capita (Plato Logic, 1999);  The Brewers of Europe, (2002)  www.cbmc.org  - europos alims; Q. 
Truong and H.T. Pham, Product extension: the case of Bivina beer in Vietnam, Challenges on the Path 
to Development, Q. Truong (ed.), Bangkok: SAV/SOM Joint Publishing, August, 135-159 (2000). 
Carlsberg Okocim annual report, 12, (2002); www.okocim-carlsberg.pl (accessed July 2004); Bak 
(2003), see reference 5; Nguyen et al. (2004), see reference 4.  
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Exhibit 2: Trade-offs between global and local brand strategies   
0% 
(local 
brand only) 
100% 
(global 
brand only)
Product portfolio: 
Share of global brand 
volume 
margin 
Volume 
(liters) 
Note:  = direction of chan            ge with increasing incomes. 
Margin 
(%)
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  Exhibit 3: Branding Strategies 
Stay out 
Global brand  
strategy
Local brand 
strategy
Multi-tier 
strategy
Carlsberg
pre-2000 
Orkla 
pre-2000 
Carlsberg
2004 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Low 
 
Value 
of the 
global 
brand  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Low                                   High 
Operational capabilities 
for emerging economies 
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Exhibit 4: Carlsberg Brands in Emerging Economies: Examples 
 
Brands History Positioning 
Poland 
Carlsberg Global brand, brewed in Poland Premium brand 
Okocim (Okocim Jasne Pełne 
and Okocim Mocne) 
Acquired with the acquisition of Okocim in 
1996 
National brand 
Bosman (Bosman Full and 
Bosman Special) 
Acquired in 2001 from Bitburger and included 
into Carlsberg-Okocim Group in 2002 
Regional brand 
Kasztelan (Kasztelan Jasne 
Pełne and Kasztelan Mocne) 
Acquired in 2001 from Bitburger and included 
into Carlsberg-Okocim Group in 2002 
Regional brand 
Piast (Piast Jasne Pełne and 
Piast Mocne) 
Acquired when taking over Dylan (NL) Regional brand 
Książ (Książ and Wrocławski 
Full)  
Acquired when taking over Dylan (NL) 
 
Regional brand 
Karmi Newly created  Women 
Volt (Volt Original and Volt 
Mocne) 
Newly created Youth market  
Harnaś Strong beer, newly created in 2003 Men   
Lithuania 
Carlsberg Global brand, brewed in the region Premium  
Svyturys Acquired with the acquisition of Svyturys in 
1999 
National umbrella 
brand 
Utenos alus Acquired by BBH in 1999  National umbrella 
brand 
Baltika Originally Russian brand introduced by BBH 
in the early1990s, but initially unsuccessful.  
Baltic region brand 
Vietnam 
Carlsberg Global brand, brewed in Vietnam Premium brand 
Tuborg Global brand, introduced in Hue, later 
withdrawn. 
Premium brand 
Halida Brand created at the outset of the JV in Hanoi. National brand, 
mainly Hanoi region. 
Huda Brand created at the outset of the JV in Hué.  Regional brand for 
Central Vietnam.  
Festival Newly created light beer Local brand in Hué 
 
 
 29
Exhibit 5: Acquisition and JV Strategies for Emerging Economies 
 Description Purpose Conventional 
opposite case 
Drawbacks 
Staged 
acquisition 
Occurs in several 
stages with foreign 
investor initially 
acquiring only an 
equity stake, and 
gradually increasing 
their equity to 100%.  
Stage acquisitions allow 
continued involvement of 
previous owners where 
they are unwilling to sell 
outright, or favoured to 
maintain legitimacy with 
local consumers. 
Full acquisition 
with immediate 
full equity 
control. 
Shared control as 
source of 
conflict; 
uncertainty over 
conditions of 
eventual full 
takeover.  
Multiple 
acquisition 
Entry by acquiring 
several independent 
businesses, and 
subsequently 
integrating them.  
Through multiple 
acquisitions global 
players can build a 
nationwide strong market 
position in a traditionally 
fragmented market. 
Acquisition 
forming the 
core for a new 
operation that 
may then grow 
organically. 
Simultaneous 
integration of 
multiple 
acquisitions 
Indirect 
acquisition 
An acquisition 
outside the focal 
market of a company 
that also owns an 
affiliate in the same 
emerging economy.   
The prime objective of 
the indirect acquisition 
may be outside the 
country. The affiliate may 
be a strategic asset 
motivating the 
acquisition, but this is 
rare. 
A direct 
acquisition of 
the focal unit 
in the country 
concerned.   
Locally, the local 
affiliate may or 
may not fit with 
the existing local 
operations. 
Brownfield 
acquisition 
An acquisition in 
which the foreign 
investor subsequently 
invests more 
resources in the 
operation, such that it 
almost resembles a 
Greenfield project. 
Brownfield acquisitions 
provide access to crucial 
local assets under control 
of local firms that are in 
many other ways not 
competitive.   
An acquired 
firm forming 
the main 
building block 
of the new 
operation. 
Post-acquisition 
investments may 
exceed the price 
originally paid 
for the acquired 
firm. 
Joint 
venture 
Establishment of a 
new company in 
which two or more 
parents share control, 
and contribute 
resources.  
Accessing local resources 
without taking 
responsibility for an 
entire existing company.  
(Fully owned) 
Acquisition, or 
Greenfield.  
Shared control as 
source of 
conflict. 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Carlsberg in Poland, Lithuania and Vietnam 
  Poland Lithuania  Vietnam
         Okocim Kasztelan Bosman Piast Svyturys Utenos Alus Kalnapilis Halida Huda
Early 
1990s 
SOE      SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE
1992 Privatised to public         
1993        Privatized, to
insiders  
 JV: Carlsberg,
IFU and Halimex 
 JV: Carlsberg, IFU 
and Hue brewery  
1994       Brau & Brunnen
(Germany) acquires 25% 
Privatised to
individual 
investor 
    
1996       Carlsberg acquired
31.6%, Brau & Brunnen 
exits 
Privatised  
 
Individual 
investor sells 
to Bitburger  
Privatised to 
individual 
investor 
1997 Carlsberg brand is brewed 
in Poland 
 First       
negotiations  
1998          
1999       Bitburger
acquires 
99.39%  
Carlsberg
acquires 97.6% 
 Owned by BBH   Owned by 
BBH   
2000          Dyland
buys 98%  
Sale (transfer) 
to BBH 
Merger of Carlsberg with Orkla: 
Carlsberg owns 50% of BBH 
  2001 Carlsberg increases equity 
stake to 50.1%, followed 
by public offer 
Carlsberg Okocim acquires 
ownership from Bitburger 
Carlsberg 
acquires 
Dyland  Merger, into Svyturys-Utenos alus Sold    
2002 Carlsberg increases equity stake to 71.4%. Start of 
operational integration. 
 Operational integration   
2003 Increase of equity stake to 75%. Carlsberg acquires 
stake of IFU, now 
owns 60% 
Carlsberg acquires 
stake of IFU, now 
owns 50% 
2004  Call for buying outstanding shares, and withdrawal from 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Pan-European operational 
integration and production capacity sharing.  
Operational 
integration 
of separate 
legal entity  
Coordination of distribution and 
rationalization of production with other 
BBH companies (e.g. in Latvia).  
 
 New
JV for 
distri-
bution 
  
 
 31
